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Efficient key pre-distribution for wireless sensor
networks: a case study on 6LoWPAN networks
running Contiki-OS
Abstract. The Internet of Things is imposing an evolution of the capa-
bilities of wireless sensor networks. The new IP-based 6LoWPAN stan-
dard for low power sensor networks allows an almost seamless connection
of local sensor networks to the Internet. This makes it easier to connect
local sensor networks to data processing servers or to provide web services
for those networks. On the other hand, the connection to the Internet
also opens doors for unauthorized nodes to become part of the local net-
work. Therefore, measures need to be taken to protect the information
that is captured and communicated within the local network. The most
important challenge in doing so, is the implementation of a key manage-
ment architecture, keeping in mind that the sensor nodes are constrained
in power consumption and data storage capacity.
This paper builds on a previously proposed symmetric key management
scheme for 6LoWPAN networks. The original scheme is based on wired
bootstrapping for the enrollment of new nodes, while the paper at hand
proposes a wireless method for key pre-distribution. We analyze the orig-
inal wired scheme and its shortcomings. Next, we propose the new wire-
less scheme and elaborate on the practical implementation on Zolertia
Z1 nodes running Contiki-OS. We show that it is possible to provide
end-to-end security using wireless bootstrapping within the constraints
of the tiny nodes at hand.
Keywords: 6LoWPAN, Wireless Sensor Network Security, key pre-distribution,
Zolertia Z1, Contiki-OS
1 Introduction
6LoWPAN is a new communication standard for wireless sensor networks [1].
Because the standard is based on IPv6, it allows an easy integration between
local sensor networks and the Internet. This way, it is unnecessary to install
complex gateways to allow the communication of 6LoWPAN sensor nodes with
data processing servers connected to the Internet or to provide web services for
the sensor networks. On the downside, connecting local sensor networks to the
Internet makes them vulnerable for all known security attacks in IP networks,
besides the vulnerabilities that are already present in local wireless sensor net-
works [2]. Whereas traditional computers in traditional IP networks have a large
capacity for the implementation of security architectures, the nodes in wireless
sensor networks are limited in data storage and power budget.
2In this paper, we present a scheme that provides end-to-end security in 6LoW-
PAN networks using the Zolertia Z1 hardware platform. We use the open source
operating system Contiki [3], which is developed to operate on constrained sen-
sor nodes. Contiki allows multitasking and is C-based. It uses the µIPv6 stack
for 6LoWPAN communications. The scheme builds on a previously proposed
scheme using wired bootstrapping for the enrollment of new network nodes [4].
We identify the shortcomings of this scheme and propose a new method for key
pre-distribution. The new method renders the wired interface obsolete by using
the wireless radio for secure bootstrapping. We obtain a higher level of security
by pre-configuring the sensor node firmware with a unique secret key that is
used during key transfer of the bootstrapping phase. In addition, we augment
the user friendliness by allowing multiple nodes to connect at the same time.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we discuss related work and
background information. In Sect. 3 we present the proposed key management
architecture based on a wireless key pre-distribution mechanism. Next, the im-
plementation and the performance of the scheme are dealt with in Sect. 4 and
Sect.5, respectively. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Sect. 6.
2 Background
2.1 Related Work
This paper builds on the scheme that was presented in [4]. In the remainder of
the paper, we refer to that scheme as the ’original scheme’. In order to be able
to analyze the original scheme and propose a new scheme, this section explains
the topology of the original scheme and the wired bootstrapping method.
As depicted in Fig. 1, the key management scheme infrastructure consists of
– a tablet PC,
– a portable Physical Unclonable Function (PUF),
– a trusted central entity (CE),
– a 6LoWPAN edge router (ER),
– the individual sensor nodes.
The original scheme is a distributive scheme that uses parts of the SPINS
protocol [5] and the Zigbee 2007 security scheme [6]. It consists of three phases:
the bootstrapping phase, the discovery phase and the pairing phase.
In the bootstrapping phase, the tablet and the PUF generate cryptographic
strong keys for the entire network. The CE receives these keys through a secure
connection and stores them in the database. Then, the ER sends a request to
receive a network key over an encrypted tunnel. Sensor nodes are added to the
network through a wired interface to the CE. Through the installer laptop, a
key request packet is sent over an encrypted tunnel to the central entity, after
which the node information is stored in the database. After authorization of the
node by the user (through the tablet), the node receives the network key and a
unique sensor key.
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Fig. 1. Topology of the key management scheme
In the discovery phase the sensor nodes use a routing protocol to establish
their routes. The communication is secured by the shared network key.
In the pairing phase two entities establish a session key by using a variant of
the SNEP protocol [5] based on the Needham-Schroeder symmetric protocol [7].
The CE plays the role of the key distribution center and shares a sensor key with
each node in the network. One node sends a request message to another node
to initiate the communication. The other node replies with a challenge, after
which the first node transfers this challenge, together with additional data on
itself, to the CE. After performing the authentication, the CE will send a session
key to both nodes, encrypted with their individual sensor keys. To successfully
complete the key transfer, the first node demands a verification from the other
node, after which the nodes can start communicating in a secure manner.
2.2 Security Goals
Confidentiality protects the overall content or a field in a message. One way
to achieve this is by using symmetric key cryptography for encryption with
a shared secret key.
Entity Authentication ensures that the other end of a connection or the orig-
inator of a packet is the entity that is claimed. Entity authenticity can be
obtained by including a message authentication code (MAC) in each packet.
Data Integrity ensures that a packet is not modified during transmission. This
is typically achieved by including a message integrity code (MIC) or a check-
sum in each packet.
Freshness ensures that a malicious entity does not resend previously captured
packets.
42.3 Sensor Network Platform
Our selected hardware platform comprises of the Zolertia Z1 [8] sensor nodes
running the Contiki OS with the µIP communication stack. The nodes are
equipped with a MSP430F2617 microcontroller [9] that offers 8 kB of RAM
and 92 kB of Flash memory. The wireless communications are handled by the
CC2420 transceiver from Chipcon [10] operating in the 2.4 GHz range. The
CC2420 is compliant with the IEEE802.15.4 standard [11] offering MAC and
baseband modem support. In addition, it has an AES128 co-processor [12] that
operates in three different block cipher modes1 [13]. During communications the
AES core can perform in-line security operations unburdening the load of the
microcontroller. Furthermore, it can also be used freely by the application for
higher level security operations.
3 Proposed Wireless Key Pre-distribution Mechanism
In this section, we present our wireless key pre-distribution mechanism for effi-
cient security bootstrapping of wireless sensor nodes. This work aims to improve
the user friendliness and security trade-offs for the wired bootstrapping mech-
anism described in [4]. We start with an analysis of the wired bootstrapping
system in Sect. 3.1. Followed by the general structure of our solution in Sect. 3.2
and finally, the security properties in Sect. 3.3.
3.1 Analysis of The Wired Bootstrapping Mechanism
Starting from the symmetric key management scheme described in Sect. 2.1, we
notice that key pre-distribution is required to provide the sensor nodes with net-
work associated key material. Without the appropriate key material, the nodes
are not able to participate in secure network communications. Furthermore, load-
ing the keys into the nodes prior to deployment is not possible due to absence of
network association. The original scheme solves this problem by using a wired
bootstrapping mechanism to initialize the nodes with the necessary security in-
formation during node placement [4]. After a thorough study we noticed that
the described method comes with some disadvantages.
Scalability The wired interface has a negative influence on network scalability.
When facing larger networks the key bootstrapping becomes tedious and
unmanageable due to the limitation of configuring one node at a time.
Applicability The need for an additional communication channel on the nodes
limits the applicability of the entire symmetric scheme. Not only does it
require additional resources to implement the interface, nodes without a
serial interface are not able to participate in secure communications.
1 Three block cipher modes are: Cipher-block chaining mode (CBC-MAC), Counter
mode (CTR) and Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM)
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Security Due to the unencrypted key transfer between the node and its access
point, the scheme is vulnerable for eavesdropping attacks [2]. Furthermore,
adding nodes requires the trust of additional hardware for secure key trans-
fer. Another threat arises when attackers start using the wired interface as
a device access point. Therefore, proper precautions must be taken into ac-
count when implementing the interface.
3.2 General Structure of the Proposed Solution
After evaluating the wired bootstrapping mechanism we opted for a wireless
approach for key pre-distribution. The general structure of our solution can be
divided into two separate preparation phases. The first phase is handled by the
sensor node vendor and the second by the user during deployment.
Vendor Preparation
The sensor node vendor supplies the user with the sensor node hardware and
firmware. In our solution, the vendor is required to extend the firmware with
an unique pre-installed Bootstrap Key (Kb) that is linked to the node’s MAC
address or node ID. The Kb’s are used only temporary during the “user prepa-
ration” phase for secure key transfer between the Central Entity (CE) and the
sensor node. Every Kb is derived from a Master Boostrap Key (Kmb)2 using a
Key Derivation Function (KDF) such as [14] in combination with a node’s MAC
address. By using the node ID as additional KDF input we ensure that each Kb
is unique and related to the specified sensor node. These firmware preparations
are illustrated in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Vendor firmware preparation
Providing the KDF with the Kmb and a list of all the node IDs, the vendor
firmware generator is able to create firmware files containing an unique Kb. This
results in an unique firmware file for each sensor node. Moreover, the vendor
collects all the Kb’s with their associated node ID in a list that is used during
the “user preparation” phase.
2 The Master Boodstrap Key is held secret by the vendor to prevent attackers from
cloning the generated Bootstrap Keys.
6User Preparation
After the “vendor preparations” the nodes containing the required firmware are
ready for deployment. The user starts by updating the CE security database
with the list of generated Kb’s from the vendor. This is done by uploading the
list into the tablet and transferring the keys to the security database through a
secure connection as is shown in Fig. 3. Once the database is up-to-date the CE
is ready to accept key requests from the sensor nodes.
Fig. 3. Central Entity (CE) database preparation
If a node wants to join a network it sends out a key request packet through
its wireless radio. The packet is unencrypted and contains information about
the node. The user has to ensure that, during the key request, the nodes are
within a range of 10 centimeters of the 6LoWPAN edge router (ER). This allows
the ER to ignore unencrypted packets from which the signal strength is below a
predefined value. Other initialized nodes in the network will automatically drop
the unencrypted packets by default. Fig. 4 illustrates the various components of
the setup.
Fig. 4. Adding new nodes
Once the ER receives and identifies a valid key request, it is transfered
through an encrypted tunnel to the CE for further processing. The CE anal-
Efficient key pre-distribution for wireless sensor networks 7
yses the node information from the key request packet and checks whether the
node ID is linked to a valid Kb in the security database. Upon a valid check the
request is stored and awaits approval from the user through the tablet. Other-
wise, the key request is dropped. In case multiple key requests from the same
node arrive, only the first one is stored.
The next step requires the user to manually approve the stored key requests.
Similar to the original scheme the user makes use of the tablet interface to either
acknowledge or decline a request [4]. For each approved request the CE creates a
unique security device in its database which contains all the security information3
needed by the requesting node. This information is encrypted using a block
cipher such as AES [12] by the CE using the individual Kb. After completion a
reply packet is created containing the encrypted message and sent back to the
ER for broadcasting in the 6LoWPAN network.
Finally, the requesting node receives a reply from the CE through the ER
and tries to decrypt the packet with its own Kb. Upon successful decryption, the
security information is stored and the node is ready to participate in network
communications.
3.3 Wireless Bootstrapping Properties
We evaluated our solution using the same analysis as in Sect. 3.1.
Scalability In contrast to the wired bootstrapping mechanism, our system has
good scaling properties. Due to the absence of a physical connection the
nodes are able to request keys in parallel, greatly reducing the deployment
time.
Applicability By using the wireless radio as bootstrapping channel, we allow
devices without a wired interface to participate in secure network communi-
cations. In addition, we save node resources by reusing existing components
in the sensor nodes.
Security Our solution provides confidentiality, integrity and authenticity dur-
ing key transfer as well as replay protection by incorporating a nonce counter.
In comparison to the wired bootstrapping, we eliminate the need to trust
additional hardware operated by a third party.
Robustness The system has good resilience against node capture. Consider a
scenario where multiple nodes are physically compromised and the Kb’s are
extracted. Other nodes are not affected by the compromise because every
node has an unique Kb. Furthermore, revoking Kb’s is trivial due to the
centralized topology of the network. On the other hand, obtaining Kmb
with information from the individual Kb’s should be very difficult because
of the KDF.
3 Security information contains key material that is linked to the network where the
key request was registered.
84 Implementation of The Wireless Bootstrapping
Mechanism
The implementation of the wireless bootstrapping mechanism is spread out over
various components. We start by discussing the vendor firmware generator in
Sect. 4.1. Consecutively, we describe the Contiki implementation on the individ-
ual sensor nodes in Sect. 4.2 and the extension of the wireless access points in
Sect. 4.3. Finally, we describe the CE server configuration in Sect. 4.4.
4.1 Vendor Firmware Generator
As mentioned in Sect. 3.2, the vendor is responsible for providing the sensor
nodes with unique firmware files containing the Kb. In addition, the vendor
should provide a list of key value pairs linking the node ID to a matching Kb.
We use the standardized KDF1 key derivation function [14] in combination
with the NIST recommended SHA3-256 hashing algorithm [15]. In order to re-
duce implementation time we use the open source Java Bouncy Castle crypto
library to provide us with an implementation of the SHA3 algorithm [16].
With the KDF operational we used scripting to create the vendor firmware
generator. The script derives a Kb from the specified Kmb using a copy of the
node IDs as additional input for the KDF. Each generated Kb is then copied to
a placeholder in one of the sensor node’s source files and compiled to an unique
firmware file as illustrated in Fig. 5. Besides firmware generation, the script also
creates an XML file containing a list of the node IDs and their derived Kb’s.
Fig. 5. Vendor firmware generator operation
4.2 Sensor Node Contiki Implementation
The wireless bootstrapping implementation on the sensor nodes is focused on
area and robustness. We tried to use as many built-in components of Contiki to
reduce the memory consumption as well as the complexity of our implementa-
tion, e.g. MAC broadcasting. The bootstrapping functionality is mainly situated
in the MAC layer of the µIP stack and makes use of its broadcast capabilities.
The next paragraph describes the node’s behavior when connecting to a network.
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Consider a blank sensor node without associated key material wanting to
join a network. Starting with a system reset the node checks its memory for key
material. When dealing with a blank node, this check fails and the node initiates
the bootstrap procedure. Immediately after initialization, the node sends out a
single unencrypted hello message containing the node ID and a one-byte message
code indicating a key request packet. Because the node has no knowledge of the
surrounding entities or the CE, the packet is broadcasted on MAC level using
the existing Contiki functions. Once the hello message has been transmitted
the node waits for a reply message coming from the CE. Note that during the
bootstrapping state the node is not able to react on any packets including routing
messages except hello reply messages.
When receiving a packet of the correct length the node considers the message
to be a hello reply coming from the CE. The hello reply message is an encrypted
packet containing the requesting node’s key material. The packet is encrypted
using the AES block cipher in combination with the node’s Kb, providing packet
confidentiality and data integrity as well as authenticity and packet freshness.
The integrity is preserved by calculating and appending a MIC tag of 8 bytes to
the message. On the other hand, authenticity is provided by the fact that only
two entities have knowledge over the Kb, being the node in question and the
CE. The packet freshness is implemented by incorporating a nonce counter in
the message. The reply message format is shown in Fig. 6.
Fig. 6. Hello reply message format (size in Bytes)
The node tries to decrypt the reply packet using its Kb as decryption key for
the dedicated AES core in CCM mode. In case the message authentication fails,
the node drops the packet and returns to its wait state. Otherwise, the packet
is parsed and the key material is extracted and stored in the node’s memory.
Once the keys are stored, the program performs a software reset forcing re-
initialization. This time the node detects the key material and normal operations
are started. Note that the Kb is only used during key transfer of the wireless
bootstrapping, not during normal security operations.
4.3 Wireless Access Point Contiki Implementation
The wireless bootstrapping mechanism is implemented as an extension of the
wireless access point or Edge router (ER) functionality. In contrast to the wire-
less sensor nodes, the ER has to cope with both normal security operations and
the wireless bootstrapping operations at the same time. Therefore, we chose to
extend the Contiki process on the ER in order to handle these additional re-
quirements. The implementation resides in the MAC layer and application layer
of the µIP stack. We start by explaining the ER behavior during key requests
10
followed by the behavior during hello reply messages.
Starting with the MAC layer, as described in the previous Sect. 4.2, the nodes
send out an unencrypted key request packet as a MAC broadcast message. In
normal circumstances these packets would be ignored by the ER due to failed
integrity check at MAC level. However, by verifying the signal strength and
the message length the ER allows these packets to flow through for further
processing. In our case we chose a minimum signal strength value that translates
in a distance of approximately 10 centimeters.
The unencrypted packets that flow through are considered to be key request
messages and are handed over to the ER process. The ER process resides at the
application layer and has access to a UDP connection. Since the nodes do not
know the CE’s address, the ER process is responsible for forwarding the packet
to the CE. This is done by extracting the key request payload and formating it
to a UDP packet designated for the CE. Upon completion, the UDP packet is
transmitted through an encrypted tunnel to the CE.
Once the key request has been processed a reply is generated by the CE. The
hello reply is forwarded over the UDP connection, through the encrypted tunnel,
back to the ER. The ER process translates the reply message payload to a MAC
broadcast packet and hands it over to the wireless radio for transmission. Note
that the requesting node should be in a one-hop radius from the ER to receive
the reply packet.
4.4 Central Entity Server Configuration
Since the Central Entity holds the cryptographic key material of the entire net-
work, additional care must be applied when extending its functionality. Careless
implementations can lead to vulnerabilities which can be exploited by adver-
saries. Therefore, we focused on providing a robust implementation of the CE’s
key pre-distribution mechanism. The complete mechanism is written as a stand-
alone Java UDP server that listens to incoming packets coming from the en-
crypted tunnels. The server stands in direct contact with the security database
through a secure connection, giving access to the necessary key material.
In case of an incoming key request, the packet is parsed and followed by
an immediate identity check. The identity of the node can be verified by the
presence of a Kb record in the database. Upon an invalid result the packet is
dropped. Otherwise, the server continues with verifying if the request was al-
ready processed before storing it in the database. Once the request is stored, it
awaits approval from the user, as described in Sect. 3.2.
A separate thread, that makes use of the same UDP connection, handles the
approved requests. For each request, the server creates a new security device in
its database and selects new key material according to the origin of the request.
The origin is verified by checking the address of the ER where the request was
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registered. Finally, a reply packet is created and encrypted using the correspond-
ing Kb as encryption key for the AES-CCM core. We used the Bouncy Castle
implementation of AES-CCM for encrypting the packets.
5 Performance Analysis
One of the most important aspects of wireless sensor networks is resource man-
agement. Due to the limited availability of processing power, memory and energy
it becomes difficult to implement complex functionality on the sensor nodes. For
that reason we compared the memory requirements of our implementation with
the requirements of the wired bootstrapping interface. The results are shown in
Fig. 7. The measurements are normalized to the total available memory of the
Zolertia Z1 platform, which is 92 kB of ROM and 8 kB of RAM memory.
Fig. 7. Memory requirements of the different Contiki implementations on both the
sensor node and ER
The sensor node measurements are given for a UDP client example program.
First of all, we list the UDP client implementation without security as a refer-
ence for the memory requirements of security with bootstrapping. Then we give
the results of the wired bootstrapping implementation, followed by the wireless
bootstrapping. Note that the differences in memory requirements between the
wired and wireless implementations are fairly minimal. However, if we consider
the gains in user friendliness, the freed-up resources as explained in Sect. 3.1,
and the stronger security of the wireless bootstrapping mechanism; our wireless
solution is more favorable.
The memory requirements of the edge router extension are also shown in
Fig. 7. Here we see that extending the functionality with the wireless bootstrap-
ping mechanism has a small impact on memory requirements.
It is pointed out that the results of the vendor firmware generator and the
CE java server are not included in Fig. 7, because they are irrelevant in this
comparison.
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6 Conclusion
We presented our wireless bootstrapping mechanism as an improvement on the
wired bootstrapping mechanism described by Smeets et al. [4]. We aim at achiev-
ing both higher security and increased user friendliness without the need for
additional hardware. Our solution is integrated in the Contiki OS and evaluated
on the Zolertia Z1 platform with the focus on a robust implementation. The
results show that by using wireless bootstrapping we achieve reduced memory
costs in comparison to the wired mechanism with the advent of stronger secu-
rity. In the future we plan to examine the effect of various attacks against the
wireless bootstrapping mechanism and we also plan to increase the resilience
against Denial-Of-Service attacks.
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